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As with most new things, the big data revolution in criminal justice has 
historic antecedents—indeed, a 1965 Presidential Commission called for 
some of the same data analysis that police departments and courts are 
today developing and implementing.  But there is no doubt we are on the 
precipice of a criminal justice data revolution, and it is a good time to 
take stock and to begin developing guidelines so that, as much as 
possible, criminal justice systems might reap the benefits and avoid the 
pitfalls of this newly data-centric world.  In that spirit, I propose ten 
high-level rules to guide criminal justice big data implementations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson gave a special message to Congress on 
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice.1  Decrying the crime rate and 
its fiscal and human costs, the President gave a far-reaching address in which he 
announced the appointment of a Presidential Commission to “probe . . . fully and 
deeply into the problems of crime in our nation.”2  When that Commission, which 
included future Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., issued its 340-page 
report in 1967, it said this about law enforcement’s use of technology: 
 
The Scientific and Technological revolution that has so radically 
changed most of American society during the past few decades has had 
surprisingly little impact upon the criminal justice system.  In an age 
when many executives in government and industry . . . ask the scientific 
and technical community for independent suggestions on possible 
alternatives and for objective analyses of possible consequences of their 
actions, the public officials responsible for establishing and 
administering the criminal law—the legislators, police, prosecutors, 
lawyers, judges, and corrections officials—have almost no 
communication with the scientific and technical community. 
 
Even small businesses employ modern technological devices and 
systems, but the Nation’s courts are almost as close to the quill pen era as 
they are to the age of electronic data processing.  The police, with crime 
laboratories and radio networks, made early use of technology, but most 
police departments could have been equipped 30 or 40 years ago as well 
as they are today.3 
 
As is typically the case, a bit of perspective makes seemingly novel changes 
appear less so, and it is hard to fault current police departments and court systems 
                                                                                                                                      
1   Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Law Enforcement and the 
Administration of Justice (Mar. 8, 1965) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=26800 [https://perma.cc/BBQ8-AQKA]). 
2   Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 11,236, 3 C.F.R. 329 (1964–1965), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105658 [https://perma.cc/6U7P-94SY]. 
3   PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SOCIETY 245 (1967), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7VF-
PWRT].  Among its more than two hundred recommendations, the Commission was the impetus for 
the 911 emergency telephone system.  Id. at 250–51, 291; SEASKATE, INC., THE EVOLUTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE TECHNOLOGY 2–3 (1998), https://www.justnet.org/pdf/PoliceTech.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WT4F-JZ5D].  The Seaskate report includes a police technology timeline running 
from the 1850s through 1996.  SEASKATE, INC., supra, at 22–23.  For articles on recent developments 
in policing technology, see Police Technology: A Curated Collection of Links, MARSHALL PROJECT, 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/247-police-technology [https://perma.cc/E5HE-V8E9] 
(last updated Jan. 27, 2018, 11:44 AM). 
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for seeking to employ the modern techniques of data analysis when history shows 
that they would otherwise be criticized for ignoring them.4  The 1965 Commission 
established a Science and Technology Task Force which sought, among other 
things, “[t]o identify and describe crime control problems in a form susceptible to 
quantitative analysis,” and “[t]o suggest organizational formats within which 
technological devices and systems can be developed, field tested, and rendered 
useful.”5  The Commission had high hopes for technology, since, in its absence, 
“[v]irtually all the efforts of the Commission [were] hampered by the pervasive 
lack of adequate objective information about crime and the possible effects of 
various techniques for crime control.”6  That criticism applied to then-current 
sentencing practice: “Each year, judges in this country pass roughly 2 million 
sentences.  Almost all sentencing decisions are made with little or no information 
on the likely effect of the sentence on future criminal behavior.”7  That criticism 
applied to then-current policing practice: “About 200,000 policemen spend half of 
their time on ‘preventive’ patrol.  Yet, no police chief can obtain even a rough 
estimate of how much crime is thereby ‘prevented.’”8  The contemporary 2018 
answer to both problems would be the analytics of big data. 
This is not to say that the Commission believed technology a panacea.  
Instead, while it was confident in technology’s ability—“[t]echnology can . . . fill 
most reasonable requests and can thereby provide considerable help to law 
enforcement”—the Commission explicitly recognized technology’s costs: “We 
must still decide what devices we want relative to the price we are willing to pay in 
dollars, invasion of privacy, and other social costs.”9  As we today contemplate a 
                                                                                                                                      
4   As Andrew Ferguson has pointed out, “[a]t some level, most decision-making systems 
involve prediction [and] [t]he criminal justice system is no exception.”  Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, 
Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1113, 1120 (2017).  Ric Simmons has similarly 
noted that “[t]he criminal justice system has always been concerned with predictions.”  Ric Simmons, 
Quantifying Criminal Procedure: How to Unlock the Potential of Big Data in Our Criminal Justice 
System, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 947, 948 (2016). 
5   PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 245. 
6   Id. at 247. 
7   Id.  This is not to say that algorithmic solutions had not been previously proposed.  Parole 
boards began to use mathematical algorithms at least as early as the 1920s.  See Jason Tashea, 
Calculating Crime: Attorneys Are Challenging the Use of Algorithms to Help Determine Bail, 
Sentencing and Parole Decisions, 103 A.B.A. J. 54, 57 (2017); OFFICE OF PROB. & PRETRIAL SERVS., 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL POST CONVICTION RISK 
ASSESSMENT 4 (2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/pcra_sep_2011_0.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SFU8-6QWA].  And such efforts have continued after the 1965 Commission, including 
during the 1980s when the original United States Sentencing Commission analyzed 10,000 records 
“to determine which distinctions were important in pre-guidelines [sentencing] practice.”  U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL 5 (2016).  It has only been in the past decades, however, 
that we have witnessed a very significant increase in the use of “evidence-based correctional 
practices.”  Cecelia Klingele, The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections, 91 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 537, 551–52 (2015); see also Ferguson, supra note 4, at 1121. 
8   PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 247. 
9   Id. at 246. 
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record everything world of “Fourth Amendment time machines,”10 even the 
Commission’s specific examples seem remarkably timely: 
 
It is technically feasible, for example, to cut auto theft drastically by 
putting a radio transmitter in every car in America and tracking all cars 
continuously.  But this might cost a billion dollars and, even more 
important, create an intolerable environment of unending surveillance.  
Science can provide the capability, but the public as a whole must 
participate in the value discussion of whether or not the capability is 
worth its financial and social costs.11 
 
The same crime-control/privacy balance is demonstrated in the Commission’s 
recommendations for adjudication and policing, which include the following: 
 
The Commission recommends[] [that] [s]tatistical aids for helping in 
sentencing and selection of proper treatment of individuals under 
correctional supervision should be developed.12 
 
Criminal justice could benefit dramatically from computer-based 
information systems [that] . . . can aid in the following functions: 
[E]nabling a police officer to check rapidly the identification of people 
and property . . . . 
[A]ltering police deployment in response to changing patterns of crime 
on an hourly, daily, seasonal or emergency basis. 
[P]roviding a collection of anonymous criminal histories to find out how 
best to interrupt a developing criminal career and to achieve a better 
understanding of how to control crime.13 
 
Again, the Commission did not ignore the risks in these developments, including 
those to information privacy.14  It thus recommended decentralization of some 
records, audit controls, encryption, and automated purging of stale data.15 
                                                                                                                                      
10  See Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Time Machines (And What They Might Say 
About Police Body Cameras), 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 933, 937 (2016). 
11  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 246.  Cf. 
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (considering the constitutionality of longer term, single 
vehicle GPS surveillance). 
12  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 260. 
13  Id. at 266–67. 
14  The Commission recognized that: 
[W]henever government records contain derogatory personal information, they create 
serious public policy problems: [1] The record may contain incomplete or incorrect 
information.  [2] The information may fall into the wrong hands and be used to intimidate 
or embarrass.  [3] The information may be retained long after it has lost its usefulness and 
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So, big data analytics are relatively novel, including in their application to 
matters of criminal justice.  But as a fifty-year-old Commission report teaches, 
applying developing technologies to policing and criminal adjudication is not so 
novel, and “[b]ecause of the enormous range of technological possibilities, it is 
essential to begin not with technology but with problems.”16  In other words, we 
ought not to consider in a vacuum what technology might do for criminal justice, 
but instead examine the specifics of our criminal justice system, identify problems 
and weaknesses therein (such problems are of course ample), and then ask what 
technology (and other tools) can do to improve them.  Among other strengths, such 
a systems analysis will prevent the perfect from being the enemy of the good, 
allowing imperfect improvements to better our systems of criminal justice. 
In that spirit, this roundtable symposium seems like an excellent step, 
bringing together experts in anthropology, sociology, data analysis, and law, and 
community stakeholders in legislators, interest groups, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, judges, and police.  And it is no surprise that it has been convened by 
Ric Simmons, who has written some of the pioneering work on the subject.17  
Moving forward, most difficult, perhaps, but critical, will be to include meaningful 
representation of ‘the people,’ here meaning those living on the streets that will be 
policed and adjudicated.  In time, we can together formulate best practices for 
using modern data analysis in criminal justice.18  Looking forward to—and hoping 
to be a part of—that solution, I propose some tentative rules (or, perhaps more 
technically, standards) that can then be improved through a continuing 
collaborative process. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
serves only to harass ex-offenders, or its mere existence may diminish an offender’s 
belief in the possibility of redemption. 
Id. at 268. 
15  Id. at 268–69.  “A witness at congressional hearings claimed that ‘the Christian notion of 
the possibility of redemption is incomprehensible to the computer.’  By a policy of early purging of 
the files, computers permit restoring the notion of redemption to the existing manual files.”  Id. at 
269. 
16  Id. at 246. 
17  See generally Simmons, supra note 4. 
18  This is not to naively assert that actuarial justice is new to our criminal justice system; as 
Andrew Ferguson has developed, quite the contrary is the case, and there is some rich literature on 
the subject.  See Ferguson, supra note 4, at 1123–26.  But it seems fair to say that the big data 
revolution is still upon us, and sometimes it is helpful to take a step back to first principles.  Thus, in 
the words of Ric Simmons, “the rise of big data, with its vast amounts of information and vastly 
powerful methods of processing that data, brings the promise (or the threat) of a true revolution in the 
sophistication and the proliferation of [statistical prediction] tools.”  Simmons, supra note 4, at 949 
n.2.  Elizabeth Joh has similarly recognized that “[i]n this century, big data—in a variety of forms—
may bring the next dramatic change to police investigations.”  Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by 
Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 37 (2014). 
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I. RULE ONE: 
BRING TECHNOLOGY TO THE PROBLEM 
 
In traditional criminal investigations, police “move data to the question.”19  
They may want to know, say, who killed X or who stole from Y.  So, they gather 
evidence, moving data to the specific question at issue.  Big data analysis does the 
opposite: store everything, and then “move the question to the data.”20  Which of 
these is the right approach for the meta-question—or higher-level question—of 
how to improve the criminal justice system? 
Perhaps someday, data analytics will discover problems in our systems of 
criminal justice that we knew nothing of.  But for the realistic future, I propose the 
better approach remains that of the 1965 Presidential Commission: “begin not with 
technology but with problems.”21  Thus, I do not believe the first topic of 
conversation is what can big data analysis do for criminal justice?, but instead 
what are the contemporary problems in criminal justice?.  Otherwise, I fear 
significant time will be spent arguing fascinating problems of philosophy when 
those questions may become practically important only in a future day when we 
are seeking to replace quite a good system.  The reality is, unfortunately, that our 
contemporary criminal justice implementation is likely a rather unjust, racially-
biased one, in which case we ought not allow the perfect to be the enemy of the 
good.  If criminal justice sentencing is currently a proprietary, too often racially- or 
otherwise-biased black box—in the form of a single judge’s largely unexplained 
decision22—it is this to which we should compare any alternative.  If Terry-stop 
policing is currently a proprietary, too often racially- or otherwise-biased black 
box—in the form of a single officer’s ex-post boilerplate rationalization23—it is 
this to which we should compare any alternative.24 
Likewise, a theoretically perfect technological solution might be implemented 
in a manner or system that entirely negates its utility.  In other words, when it 
                                                                                                                                      
19  See Margaret Hu, Orwell’s 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion 
Test, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1819, 1845 (2017) (quoting CIA Chief Technology Officer Ira Hunt); see 
also Joh, supra note 18, at 40–41 (making the same point for big data more generally). 
20  Hu, supra note 19, at 1845.  Thus, while a study found that Los Angeles police use 
Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) for a variety of purposes, “the most common use of 
ALPRs is simply to store data for potential use during a future investigation.”  Sarah Brayne, Big 
Data Surveillance: The Case of Policing, 82 AM. SOC. REV. 977, 993 (2017). 
21  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 246. 
22  See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) (permitting largely unfettered judicial 
discretion in sentencing); see also Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1175 (2017) (“Sentencing 
courts have long enjoyed discretion in the sort of information they may consider when setting an 
appropriate sentence.”). 
23  See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting temporary detentions upon reasonable 
suspicion). 
24  See Simmons, supra note 4, at 960–65 (arguing that algorithmic policing can improve 
Terry stops); see also id. at 978–79 (demonstrating the potential difference between actual and stated 
justifications for a stop). 
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comes to improving criminal justice, it is especially important for those of us 
working in the ivory tower to work with those in the trenches.  We need to keep it 
real. 
 
II. RULE TWO: 
BRING ONLY CREDIBLE TECHNOLOGY TO THE PROBLEM 
 
This symposium has us off to a good start by including not only lawyers but 
also scientists.  The criminal justice system has a sad history of folklore 
masquerading as science, perhaps best demonstrated by decades of arson 
investigation,25 but also occurring with bite marks, hair comparisons, and other 
techniques.26  When it comes to big data analysis, we instead want to follow the 
model of DNA, in which genuine, tested science was brought into the courtroom. 
Of course, this does not mean that no difficult problems will be 
encountered—they always are when even a ‘gold standard’ science is put to novel 
use.27  To state an obvious and minimal example, that machine learning can 
effectively deduce correlations says next to nothing about whether a particular 
algorithm is accurately predicting future dangerousness.  Thus, the criminal justice 
system will have to work closely with well credentialed, independent data 
scientists, meaning scientists not employed by a vendor trying to sell a product or 
solution. 
 
III. RULE THREE: 
THE DECIDER SHOULD BE HUMAN 
 
There is increasingly robust science in automated decision making and 
artificial intelligence, and these technologies will surely continue to develop, 
perhaps even at a rapid pace.28  But at least for now (and possibly forever) when it 
comes to criminal justice, it seems the ultimate decision should always be a human 
one.  I say this not because I believe a human decision is more likely to be the right 
                                                                                                                                      
25  See Mark Hansen, Badly Burned: Long-held Beliefs About Arson Science Have Been 
Debunked After Decades of Misuse and Scores of Wrongful Convictions, 101 A.B.A. J. 37 (2015). 
26  See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC 
SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS 
(2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_foren
sic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/X26P-XBVB]. 
27  See Matthew Shaer, The False Promise of DNA Testing, ATLANTIC (June 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/a-reasonable-doubt/480747/ [https://perma.cc
/6R4E-R6UX] (chronicling some of the problems with crime laboratories and mixed DNA samples). 
28  See MAX TEGMARK, LIFE 3.0: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 40–
42 (2017) (describing timeline disagreement among experts).  For an argument that even current 
capabilities call for an increased use of computers in sentencing, see Mirko Bagaric & Gabrielle 
Wolf, Sentencing by Computer: Enhancing Sentencing Transparency and Predictability, and 
(Possibly) Bridging the Gap Between Sentencing Knowledge and Practice, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
534 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 15:527 
 
decision, if ‘right’ means accurately predicting or discerning what is intended to be 
predicted or discerned.  Indeed, I suspect quite often the human decision is 
currently rather appalling in this regard.  I instead urge this rule simply because, on 
some intuitive level, it seems important to our humanity.29 
The 1965 Presidential Commission noted that “[a] witness at congressional 
hearings claimed that ‘the Christian notion of the possibility of redemption is 
incomprehensible to the computer.’”30  Without delving into ‘Christian’ notions or 
those of any other particular faith, I suspect that most all of them share an intuition 
there being expressed: that it is preferable to be judged by a flawed human (or, 
better yet, a superhuman god) than by a computational machine.  In the words of 
Kiel Brennan-Marquez: 
 
If the answer comes back to error-reduction—if the point of judicial 
oversight is simply to maximize the overall number of accurate 
decisions—machines could theoretically do the job as well as, if not 
better than, humans.  But if the answer involves normative goals beyond 
error-reduction, automated tools—no matter their power—will remain, at 
best, partial substitutes for judicial scrutiny.31 
 
I agree with Brennan-Marquez that the latter is the case,32 and thus, even 
though I have not defended the view but instead merely appealed to intuition, I 
believe our criminal justice system should require that a human decision-maker 
decide how to act on any computationally-suggested result.33 
                                                                                                                                      
29  It is also possible that retaining a human decision-maker will increase the perceived 
legitimacy of the system and thus further procedural justice.  On the importance of such perceived 
legitimacy, see Ric Simmons, Big Data and Procedural Justice: Legitimizing Algorithms in the 
Criminal Justice System, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573 (2018). 
30  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 269. 
31  Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Powerful 
Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1250 (2017). 
32  Id.  Cf. Simmons, supra note 4, at 1009–16 (arguing for at least some entirely mechanical 
determinations of reasonable suspicion, but also positing how an officer might incorporate her 
intuitions using Bayesian inference).  For some very interesting arguments regarding the use of 
artificial intelligence in administrative decision-making more generally, see Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar, Cyberdelegation and the Administrative State (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 
2754385, 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2754385 [https://perma.cc/9Z3T
-BAP7]). 
33  But see Andrew D. Selbst, Response, A Mild Defense of Our New Machine Overlords, 70 
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 87 (2017) (thoughtfully challenging Brennan-Marquez’s specific 
hypothetical and more generally his assumptions about both human and machine decision-making).  
To Selbst, human decision-making need not be inherently different from a machine’s: “The human’s 
role . . . is to detect when input information might be missing from the model, and then supply it,” a 
“sanity check.”  Id. at 101.  Selbst agrees that humans “must remain involved in the process in case 
the machines fail to take into account certain contextual facts that are important, in case the results 
implicate values unconsidered by the data miners, or in case the results just make no sense,”  but he is 
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IV. RULE FOUR: 
THE CODE AND DECISION ALGORITHM SHOULD BE ACCESSIBLE (THOUGH NOT 
NECESSARILY PUBLIC) BUT THE DECISION ALGORITHM NEED NOT BE 
EXPLAINABLE 
 
We have constitutional norms of public trial34 and we should have the same 
for mechanisms of policing.35  Thus, any underlying algorithm used in adjudication 
or policing should be publicly available, or—at the very least—available for and 
subject to inspection by independent authorities.36  If Amazon prefers not to share 
the code or ultimate algorithm it uses to better pitch products, so be it.  But if a 
company prefers not to share the code or ultimate algorithm the State of Oklahoma 
uses in bail, diversion, sentencing, or parole decisions, society should have a ready 
answer: the state cannot do business with you.  The societal cost in lack of trust is 
simply too high when our criminal justice system runs on knowable but 
nonetheless-kept-secret algorithms. 
By contrast, I do not believe we ought to reject all machine-learned decision 
algorithms that cannot be meaningfully explained, sometimes termed ‘opaque AI’ 
or contrasted with ‘explainable AI.’37  So long as the underlying algorithm that 
lead to that decision algorithm is accessible (this rule), so long as the decision 
                                                                                                                                                      
willing to limit that human role because people often step in only to screw up the logic of the process. 
Id. at 101–02. 
34  The Sixth Amendment requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  In the words of Justice Harlan: 
Essentially, the public-trial guarantee embodies a view of human nature, true as a general 
rule, that judges, lawyers, witnesses, and jurors will perform their respective functions 
more responsibly in an open court than in secret proceedings.  A fair trial is the objective, 
and “public trial” is an institutional safeguard for attaining it. 
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 588 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted) (quoted 
by the Court in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 n.4 (1984)). 
35  See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal 
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (arguing against pervasive use of trade secrets 
in criminal justice); Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on 
Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2017) (warning of the role that technology vendors play in 
contemporary policing). 
36  See Selbst, supra note 33, at 91, 97 (calling for disclosure and testing); Simmons, supra 
note 4, at 994–99 (same).  While I would prefer full public disclosure, some argue that there are 
longstanding pressures discouraging private companies from developing policing (and perhaps 
adjudicatory) technologies.  See SEASKATE, INC., supra note 3, at 7–8.  Depending upon the relevance 
of these factors in this context, some measure of proprietary protection might be unavoidable. 
37  See Selbst, supra note 33, at 90–91 (explaining machine learning, including that “advanced 
versions of machine learning can key in on variables that have no semiotic value to humans, and thus 
we cannot truly comprehend them even as approximation.”); David Gunning, Explainable Artificial 
Intelligence (XAI), DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, https://www.darpa.mil/program/
explainable-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/2PDY-SH2M] (last visited Apr. 7, 2018) 
(introducing explainable artificial intelligence). 
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algorithm is available for extensive testing for bias and accuracy (this rule),38 so 
long as nothing is artificially held back as confidential (this rule), and so long as 
the ultimate decision maker is human (rule three), I believe there is a place in our 
criminal justice system for machine learned, non-humanly-explainable decision 
algorithms.  I would, however, reject practices like that in Wisconsin, where 
sentencing partially relies upon a proprietary code available for independent 
testing, but for which the algorithms are kept strictly secret.39  There is an 
important difference between an algorithm a private company chooses not to share 
(unacceptable) and a machine-learned algorithm of such complexity that humans 
can test but not articulate it (acceptable). 
 
V. RULE FIVE: 
ANY TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD BALANCE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
 
The Fourth Amendment has operated for hundreds of years—and is equipped 
to operate for hundreds of years more—because it requires balance: searches and 
seizures must be reasonable,40 which typically requires, says the Court, balancing 
the government need against the intrusion into security.41  In other words, how 
compelling is the government need, how well do these means further that need, 
and how do these means impact privacy and liberty (a concern that in the big data 
context includes any decrease in the traditional practical obscurity of records)? 
The 1965 Presidential Commission recognized that, as a matter of good 
policy, this same balance should be considered for changes to our criminal justice 
                                                                                                                                      
38  See, e.g., Anupam Datta et al., Algorithmic Transparency via Quantitative Input Influence, 
in TRANSPARENT DATA MINING FOR BIG AND SMALL DATA 71–94 (Tania Cerquitelli et al., eds., 2017) 
(proposing a method of such testing). 
39  See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 757, 760–64 (Wis. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
2290 (2017).  “Northpointe, Inc., the developer of COMPAS, considers COMPAS a proprietary 
instrument and a trade secret.  Accordingly, it does not disclose how the risk scores are determined or 
how the factors are weighed.”  Id. at 761.  Thus, neither party could even determine how the 
algorithm does or does not account for offender sex.  Id. at 765.  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
allowed limited use of the tool at sentencing but required this caution, among others: “The 
proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to prevent disclosure of information relating to how 
factors are weighed or how risk scores are determined.”  Id. at 769. 
40  The Fourth Amendment requires that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”  
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
41  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).  The Court explained: 
Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we generally determine whether to 
exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement by assessing, on the one 
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the 
degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.  Such 
a balancing of interests supported the [rule in a previous case]. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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process even when they are not required by our Constitution,42 a norm that should 
apply to both policing and adjudication.  So, as part of considering whether to 
adopt any new technology, it should be asked how it would affect accuracy, 
fairness (broadly conceived), limited government, and efficiency.43  This might 
seem sufficiently obvious as to not merit articulation, but the reality is that even 
the most obvious criterion—accuracy—is too often ignored in the excitement of 
the moment.  As Andrew Ferguson has chronicled, the history of predictive 
analytic policing “has been invention first, then adoption, and finally assessment 
only after the fact.”44  We cannot be unrealistic in our demands, as of course every 
technology was once novel and sometimes we can only learn as we go.  But nor 
should we ignore the basic norms of legitimacy by adopting inadequately 
considered technologies. 
Moreover, in considering these norms we must remember—and not shy away 
from—the fact that limited government norms, such as the Fourth Amendment, 
tend to be anti-accuracy norms.  Sometimes we can achieve a win-win, which is of 
course best of all: perhaps police get more reliable information on stopped 
individuals by scanning a biometric marker, but in return learn only what they need 
to know, such as whether a driver has a currently valid license or outstanding 
warrant but not (yet) revealing the details thereof.  Other times, however, a win-
win is not possible and we might choose a less accurate, fair, or efficient system 
because it is necessary to keep the government at bay.45  Other times, we might 
choose less privacy because it is more fair.46  The idea is not to prejudge the 
outcome, but rather to require the honest consideration. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
42  The Commission of course recognized the importance of constitutional rules (see, e.g., 
PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 93–95), but it ultimately 
called for societal normative judgments consistent with those rules (see, e.g., id. at 95, 246).  See also 
supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text. 
43  See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, 
POLICIES AND PERSPECTIVES 34–41 (5th ed. 2013) (identifying these as four norms of our criminal 
process).  For an extensive analysis of the many considerations that should factor into the legitimacy 
of predictive policing, see Ferguson, supra note 4, at 1148–94. 
44  Ferguson, supra note 4, at 1194. 
45  See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 268 
(calling for forced inefficiencies in records storage and thus access). 
46  See I. Bennett Capers, Race, Policing, and Technology, 95 N.C. L. REV. 1241 (2017) 
(arguing that we ought to increase policing for some—via policing everyone—in order to decrease 
racial injustice for others). 
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VI. RULE SIX: 
ANY PROPOSAL FOR PRIVACY-BASED RESTRICTION ON GOVERNMENT 
TECHNOLOGY SHOULD CONSIDER NON-GOVERNMENT USE 
 
A longstanding Fourth Amendment principle is that law enforcement need not 
alone shield its eyes from what other persons freely observe.47  I have defended 
this as a legal and normative view,48 and believe it should also have play when it 
comes to big data and criminal justice.  Any time the reason for restricting criminal 
justice use of big data analytics is for reasons of privacy harm, we should be sure 
that precisely the same harm is not already occurring in the non-government 
sector.  In general, it does not make sense to handcuff solely our criminal justice 
actors, especially when doing so has accuracy, fairness, or efficiency costs that are 
not meaningfully offset by any privacy gain.  Of course, there might sometimes be 
special reason to limit only the government,49 or the proper solution might be to, 
when possible, legislatively restrict private actors.50  But if non-government actors 
are already routinely making use of certain data in a certain way, the burden should 
be on anyone arguing the government should not be permitted to do the same. 
 
VII. RULE SEVEN: 
PRIVACY PROTECTIONS SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO ACQUISITION 
RESTRAINTS—THEY SHOULD CONSIDER ROBUST USE RESTRICTIONS 
 
Traditionally, law enforcement restraints—including the judicially declared 
restraints of the Fourth Amendment—have focused almost entirely upon the initial 
acquisition of information: there is significant restraint, say, upon law enforcement 
entering a home,51 but once information therein is lawfully seized, its analysis is 
largely independent of any continued constitutional constraint.  This system is no 
longer feasible in a world of massive over-collection of digital data and mass 
                                                                                                                                      
47  See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment protection of 
the home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when 
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”). 
48  See Mark Jonathan Blitz, James Grimsley, Stephen E. Henderson & Joseph Thai, 
Regulating Drones Under the First and Fourth Amendments, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 68–72, 
74–77 (2015). 
49  See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2015) (restricting certain company disclosures only if to the 
government); CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 98–108 (2007) (arguing that there are freedom of speech and association, 
freedom of movement and repose, right to privacy, and Fourth Amendment reasons to 
constitutionally restrict government public-camera surveillance). 
50  This may be impossible if, for example, the First Amendment protects that conduct.  See 
Rule Seven, infra Part VII. 
51  See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (“In terms that apply equally to seizures 
of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to 
the house.  Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a 
warrant.”). 
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surveillance, and thus privacy rules should often constrain the later access, use, and 
dissemination of lawfully collected data.52 
 
VIII. RULE EIGHT: 
ANY CLAIM TO FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN CONSUMER DATA, IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE ALGORITHMS, OR IN ALGORITHMIC RESULTS SHOULD BE OPPOSED 
 
In both the Apple encryption controversy and the lesser scuffle over law 
enforcement access to data conveyed through Amazon’s ‘Echo,’ the companies 
asserted First Amendment rights.  For Apple, it was a First Amendment right 
against compelled speech through forced computer code and use of its encryption 
keys.53  For Amazon, it was a First Amendment right in customer voice data and 
Alexa’s responses thereto.54  While both claims can be seen as consumer-friendly, 
each also has serious risk.  If companies are able to claim First Amendment rights 
in consumer data, and perhaps even if companies can merely assert such rights, it 
could become difficult to legislatively restrict what companies do with that data, 
meaning it could become difficult to legislatively protect privacy.  Similarly, if 
companies are able to assert First Amendment rights against needed code, it could 
become difficult to control algorithms that become embedded in our daily lives. 
As a privacy scholar, I am broadly concerned about these types of First 
Amendment claims.  I recognize, however, that these are difficult and contested 
issues.  Courts have held that computer code can be protected by the First 
Amendment,55 that corporations have at least some First Amendment rights,56 that 
there is a First Amendment right to some information gathering,57 and that certain 
                                                                                                                                      
52  See generally Henderson, supra note 10 (explaining and arguing for use restrictions); see 
also Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Fourth Amendment Anxiety, 55 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that the Supreme Court has implicitly authorized such Fourth Amendment 
restraints). 
53  Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents in Search, 
and Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Apple Inc.’s Assistance at 32–34, In the Matter 
of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus 
IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. CM 16-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016), https://assets.
documentcloud.org/documents/2722457/Apple-s-Motion-Opposing-iPhone-Order.pdf [https://perma.
cc/BZH2-Q78N]. 
54  Memorandum of Law in Support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 9–12, 
Arkansas v. Bates, No. CR-2016-370-2 (Cir. Ct. Ark. Feb. 17, 2017), https://assets.documentcloud.
org/documents/3473747/Amazon-Memorandum-Seeking-to-Quash-Echo-Search.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZA7B-8AJA]. 
55  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445–60 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding 
computer code can be protected speech but nonetheless permitting a Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act takedown); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1099–
1101 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (same). 
56  See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (striking down a 
statute barring corporate expenditures for electioneering communications). 
57  See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the 
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas.”); Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 
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restrictions upon data use and disclosure can violate the First Amendment.58  But if 
a criminal justice vendor is unrestricted in using private data in its algorithm, there 
can be serious privacy cost.  And if the vendor can prevent algorithm disclosure 
via the First Amendment (compelled speech), then the public loses its right to 
comprehend the criminal justice process.  And if a vendor is permitted to shield 
perhaps flawed results through the First Amendment, or if it refuses to code 
necessary testing for such flaws where the code has already had criminal justice 
impact, then the public loses its right to accurate and fair criminal justice. 
Thus, when code is distributed for criminal justice use, we require a doctrine 
of public dedication or waiver that would prohibit the vendor from later claiming 
First Amendment rights contrary to that criminal justice interest.  Governments 
should therefore contract to prohibit such claims, and perhaps appropriately 
tailored legislation should require such waiver. 
 
IX. RULE NINE: 
ANY SIGNIFICANT TECHNOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD REQUIRE PUBLIC 
NOTICE AND COMMENT 
 
As Christopher Slobogin has carefully developed, while police departments 
are administrative agencies and policing has developed intricate and pervasive 
forms of wide-scale surveillance, police decision-making has not historically been 
subjected to the rules applicable to other administrative rulemaking, including 
mandated notice and comment procedures.59  I agree with Slobogin that this should 
change, and I believe we should apply some similarly efficacious framework to 
structural changes within our systems of criminal adjudication.  By requiring some 
manner of public notice and comment on wide-scale changes—or even by 
encouraging such voluntary procedures—we would enable significantly better 
considered and informed decisions in both policing and adjudication, and, in the 
latter case, make the traditionally least accountable branch slightly more 
responsive to the will of the people.60 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017) (“recording police activity in public falls squarely within the First 
Amendment right of access to information”); see also Blitz et al., supra note 48, at 80–81, 85–109 
(discussing First Amendment rights to gather and record). 
58  See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (striking down a statute that 
restricted certain disclosures and uses of pharmacy records); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 
(2010) (striking down a statute that criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of 
depictions of animal cruelty); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (striking down a statute that 
criminalized intentional disclosure of illegally intercepted communications). 
59  See generally Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 91 
(2016). 
60  For some thoughts on how we might benefit from “algorithmic impact statements,” see 
Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109 (2017). 
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X. RULE TEN: 
MOST DECISIONS SHOULD BE MADE BY THE STATES 
 
States of course have the general police power, and “[p]erhaps the clearest 
example of traditional state authority is the punishment of local criminal 
activity.”61  Thus, big data analysis, like other criminal justice solutions, should 
primarily be adopted at the state level.  As it has often done, however, the federal 
government can assist through studies, resources, and voluntary standards that will 
otherwise not be realistically available,62 as well as to lead by example in the 
federal courts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The tools of big data analysis are ‘dual use,’ meaning, just like any other 
technology, they can be used for good and for ill.  Given their increasing ability, 
there seems little benefit to asking whether they have a place in the criminal justice 
system.  Instead, the useful question is when they have such a place, and I have 
proposed—among other preliminary rules—that we first look to the problems in 
our criminal justice system needing solutions, and then consider big data options 
along with any others that can be proposed or considered.  We should not naively 
expect our ‘big data progress’ to be unerringly straight and forward-moving any 
more than we would expect this of more traditional solutions.  It will be, as in all 
of life, full of zigs, zags, and even some backward falls.  If we are too concerned 
about this, we have not internalized how our criminal justice system currently 
(mal)functions.  At the same time, criminal justice failures are some of society’s 
most upsetting and harmful.  Therefore, by beginning to formulate some principles 
to direct the use of big data analysis, hopefully we can minimize those inevitable 
errors while beginning to improve our systems of criminal justice. 
                                                                                                                                      
61  Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2089 (2014) (citation omitted). 
62  See SEASKATE, INC., supra note 3, at 8–19 (describing such role of the National Institute of 
Justice and other federal agencies). 
